The Northern District of California Holds in Garciaguirre v. Samsung Electronics Co. That Conduct a Manufacturer Cannot Unwind Supports a DRAM Supply Conspiracy Claim

The Northern District of California Holds in Garciaguirre v. Samsung Electronics Co. That Conduct a Manufacturer Cannot Unwind Supports a DRAM Supply Conspiracy Claim

By J.R. Howell

November 15, 2026

Garciaguirre v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 26-cv-06345-NW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2026)

On November 14, 2026, Judge Noël Wise of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied a joint motion by Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron to dismiss a putative class action alleging that the three manufacturers, which together control more than ninety-one percent of global revenue from dynamic random-access memory, conspired in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to restrict the supply of conventional DRAM beginning in October 2022.[1]The order is significant because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a supply conspiracy claim against these same defendants four years ago in DRAM II, and because the court here, applying that decision, held that a complaint resting entirely on circumstantial evidence states a claim where it alleges that the defendants restricted supply through steps that they could not later unwind.[2]

The complaint alleges that the manufacturers cut conventional DRAM supply and then foreclosed their own return to it.

The plaintiffs, who are seventeen consumers and small businesses from five states, allege that SK Hynix announced production cuts on October 26, 2022, that Micron followed three weeks later, and that Samsung, which had weathered earlier downturns without cutting production and had stated in January 2023 that there would be no “artificial production cut,” announced cuts of its own on April 7, 2023.[3] The complaint further alleges that all three defendants, beginning in 2023, redirected manufacturing capacity from conventional DRAM to high bandwidth memory, which is a specialized product sold to a narrow set of customers for artificial intelligence accelerators and which requires approximately three to four times the silicon wafer area per gigabyte, and that all three announced between April and June 2025 that they would wind down production of DDR4 memory while that product remained in wide use.[4] According to the complaint, the price of conventional DRAM then rose 697 percent over eighteen months without any of the three defendants expanding, or announcing plans to meaningfully expand, its production capacity in response.[5] The plaintiffs also allege that Samsung and SK Hynix reportedly signed preliminary agreements in October 2025 to supply a single data center project with up to 900,000 DRAM wafers per month, that Micron announced on December 3, 2025 that it would close Crucial, which was its thirty-year-old consumer memory brand, and that each defendant introduced new vetting procedures for DRAM customers in January 2026.[6]

The court held that the claim is not a rerun of DRAM II because the defendants could not unwind what they had done.

The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that each of them made rational choices consistent with its own independent self-interest, which led the court to describe the crux of the motion as whether the case was a rerun of DRAM II.[7] In DRAM II, the Ninth Circuit held that the production cuts alleged there were not the “extreme action against self-interest” that supports an inference of agreement, in that Samsung had earlier restricted supply on its own and remained the market leader and in that Micron and SK Hynix did no more than follow Samsung one quarter later.[8] The court here accepted that reasoning as far as it reached, agreeing with the defendants that a bare decision to restrict supply and to forgo competition is insufficient under DRAM II and that the pivot to high bandwidth memory, “[s]tanding alone,” is insufficient because investment in an emerging market is not a move that no reasonable firm would make without a prior agreement.[9] The court found the difference between the two cases in the manner in which these defendants made the pivot, applying the Ninth Circuit’s rule that action against self-interest does not support an inference of agreement where it “can be easily readjusted without persistent negative consequences.”[10]

Three sets of allegations met that standard, the first being that all three defendants signed long-term agreements committing extraordinary amounts of high bandwidth memory while Samsung and SK Hynix reportedly refused long-term agreements with major customers for conventional DRAM, the second being that Micron closed a highly profitable consumer brand at the peak of a price spike, and the third being that Samsung and Micron delayed or halted the construction of multiple manufacturing plants, which the court treated as analogous to the reductions in refinery capacity that the Ninth Circuit has described as “not readily reversible.”[11] The court reasoned that these moves were “difficult if not impossible to unwind,” with the consequence that none of the defendants could return to conventional DRAM once its profitability surpassed that of high bandwidth memory, and concluded that, at the pleading stage, they are the sort of moves that no reasonable firm would make without a prior agreement.[12] The court applied the same reasoning to the exit from DDR4, which it distinguished from the earlier retirement of DDR3 on the ground that Micron continued to produce DDR3 and that the DDR4 announcements came from all three defendants within a single quarter while the product remained in wide use, and held that the DDR4 exit appears inconsistent with independent market decisions.[13]

Uniform customer vetting supplied the strongest inference of agreement.

The complaint alleges that each defendant implemented enhanced customer vetting for DRAM orders in January 2026 and that the defendants questioned customers about the identity of their end users, the quantities ordered, and whether the reported demand was real.[14] The court held that these allegations “strongly support a plausible inference of conspiracy,” reasoning that the adoption of the same vetting questions at the same time is difficult to explain absent coordination and that the practice gives each defendant a structured view of who is purchasing DRAM and in what quantities, which is a function that the complaint compares to the monitoring used by the defendants’ cartel from 1998 to 2002.[15] The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs never allege that the defendants exchanged the vetting information, holding that to require such an allegation would be to require direct evidence of the conspiracy, which is not the standard that a plus factor must meet.[16]

Public statements, industry meetings, and market structure did not advance the claim.

The court held that the defendants’ public statements to investors about supply and capital expenditure do not support an inference of conspiracy, because under DRAM II the defendants would likely have made the same statements had no conspiracy existed, a conclusion that it reached even as to Micron’s statement of September 29, 2022, made four weeks before the first production cut, that its goal was to maintain “supply discipline.”[17] The court reconciled DRAM II with the earlier Ninth Circuit decisions on which the plaintiffs relied by reading them together to mean that a public statement may count as a plus factor only if it is the sort of statement that a defendant would not likely make absent an agreement, leaving any remaining tension among those decisions to the Ninth Circuit.[18] The court likewise declined to rely on the allegation that the defendants’ executives gathered at industry conferences before each move, although the complaint identified the gatherings, the dates, and the executives, because the court read DRAM II as one that “all but forecloses” a trial court from giving weight to such meetings unless the plaintiffs can identify the information exchanged or an agreement reached there.[19] The court treated the oligopolistic structure of the market as neutral, while observing that Samsung and SK Hynix now hold roughly equal shares and that cuts initiated by SK Hynix and Micron are therefore no longer simple “follow-the-leader” moves, and followed DRAM II in holding that the defendants’ criminal price-fixing history supports the claim despite its age.[20]

The order shows plaintiffs in concentrated markets what a circumstantial complaint must allege.

Viewing the allegations as a whole, the court described supply cuts initiated by firms other than a single market leader, decisions that locked away the ability to unwind those cuts if the others were not in step, a refusal to profit from a price increase of nearly 700 percent, and near-identical vetting practices instituted at the same time, all by actors with a history of similar conduct, and characterized the picture as one of “hawks flying in formation.”[21] For plaintiffs who must plead a Section 1 claim from circumstantial evidence in an oligopoly, the order identifies the allegations that carry a complaint past DRAM II, namely commitments of capacity and of contracts that expose a firm to loss if its rivals do not follow, together with uniform practices that the firms adopted at the same time and for which the complaint supplies no independent explanation.[22] For defendants, the order confirms that three familiar categories of allegation, which are statements to investors, attendance at industry meetings, and market concentration, remain insufficient in the Ninth Circuit to support the inference.[23] For technology companies, the order places the supply arrangements of the artificial intelligence build-out, including the reported commitment of forty percent of worldwide DRAM output to a single customer, within the evidence from which a court may infer an agreement among suppliers.[24] The court did not separately address the claims under the antitrust and consumer protection statutes of California, Florida, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin, noting that judicial interpretations of federal antitrust law do not necessarily control state antitrust law and that the parties agreed for purposes of the motion that the state claims “rise and fall with the Sherman Act claim.”[25]

The case now proceeds to answers and to an initial case management conference.

The court ordered the defendants to answer no later than December 7, 2026 and reset the initial case management conference for January 12, 2027.[26] The court decided the motion on the allegations of the complaint, which it took as true, and stated that it could not resolve at the pleading stage the parties’ dispute over the relative profitability of high bandwidth memory and conventional DRAM, which the parties measured by different metrics at the hearing.[27]


[1] Garciaguirre v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 26-cv-06345-NW, ECF No. 68, at 1–3, 7, 20 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2026) (denying the motion to dismiss a claim that the defendants, which “control[ed] over 91% of global DRAM revenue,” have conspired since October 2022 to restrain trade in conventional DRAM).

[2] In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 28 F.4th 42, 45, 54 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming the dismissal of a claim that Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron conspired to coordinate DRAM supply decisions beginning in 2016). Garciaguirre, ECF No. 68, at 2, 9, 13–14 (finding that the case is not a rerun of DRAM II where the plaintiffs rely on parallel conduct and allege moves that are “difficult if not impossible to unwind”).

[3] Garciaguirre, ECF No. 68, at 1, 4 (describing the named plaintiffs and the alleged production cuts of October 26, 2022, November 16, 2022, and April 7, 2023).

[4] Id. at 4–5 (describing the alleged reallocation of capacity to high bandwidth memory and the announcements that the defendants would “wind down mainstream DDR4 production”).

[5] Id. at 6 (reciting the allegation that “not one of the three Defendants expanded or announced plans to meaningfully expand commodity DRAM production capacity”).

[6] Id. at 6–7 (reciting the allegations concerning the preliminary supply agreements, the closure of Crucial, and the introduction of “customer vetting procedures for DRAM orders”).

[7] Id. at 1–2 (summarizing the defendants’ argument that each made choices “consistent with [their own] independent self-interest”).

[8] DRAM II, 28 F.4th at 49–50 (reasoning that “restraining supply without an agreement was not as perilous as Plaintiffs claim” and that the timing of the cuts by Micron and SK Hynix was “more indicative of the ‘follow the leader’ theory”).

[9] Garciaguirre, ECF No. 68, at 12–13 (agreeing with the defendants that the pivot and “the bare decision to restrict DRAM supply and forgo competition with one another” are each insufficient).

[10] Id. at 12–13 (quoting In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015)) (requiring action “so perilous in the absence of advance agreement that no reasonable firm would make the challenged move without such an agreement”).

[11] Id. at 13–14 (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 463 (9th Cir. 1990)) (viewing “the commitment to build or not build manufacturing capacity as analogous” to a reduction in refinery capacity).

[12] Id. at 13–14 (concluding that the long-term agreements, the closure of Crucial, and the failure to take advantage of record-high prices tip the first plus factor in the plaintiffs’ favor).

[13] Id. at 10–11, 14–15 (declining to consider the DDR3 allegations and finding that the DDR4 exit “appears inconsistent with independent market decisions and consistent with a prior agreement”).

[14] Id. at 7, 15 (reciting the allegation that the defendants “question[ed] customers about end-user identity, order quantities, and the ‘reality’ of reported demand”).

[15] Id. at 15–16 (agreeing with the plaintiffs that the imposition of “stricter customer vetting at the same time” is “difficult to explain absent coordination”).

[16] Id. at 16 & n.11 (observing that plaintiffs who had direct evidence of an agreement to exchange vetting information would not need to pursue a circumstantial claim).

[17] Id. at 16–17 (quoting DRAM II, 28 F.4th at 50) (finding that neither of the two statements the plaintiffs emphasized distinguishes the case from DRAM II).

[18] Id. at 17 & n.12 (discussing Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965), and Petroleum Products, 906 F.2d at 447) (stating that any irreconcilable tension between Esco and DRAM II “is not for this Court to resolve”).

[19] Id. at 18 (declining to rely on the conference allegations “as a basis for a plausible inference of Defendants’ conspiracy”). DRAM II, 28 F.4th at 52 (holding that the plaintiffs there did “not allege facts demonstrating that Defendants actually communicated or exchanged information at these trade association meetings”).

[20] Garciaguirre, ECF No. 68, at 18–19 (finding that “the fundamental oligopolistic structure is neutral in the analysis” and that the prior convictions support the claim). DRAM II, 28 F.4th at 53 (reasoning that “the present allegations involve the same alleged coordination and actors”).

[21] Garciaguirre, ECF No. 68, at 19–20 (contrasting the “follow the leader” allegations of the earlier litigation with the allegations of this complaint).

[22] Id. at 13–16, 19–20 (weighing the first four plus factors in the plaintiffs’ favor and relying on them in the holistic analysis).

[23] Id. at 16–18 (finding that the public statements do not support an inference of conspiracy, declining to rely on the conference allegations, and treating market structure as neutral).

[24] Id. at 6, 13 (reciting the allegation that the preliminary agreements would dedicate “40% of total worldwide DRAM output . . . to a single customer” and relying on the long-term supply agreements in the analysis of the first plus factor).

[25] Id. at 9 n.5 (quoting Jones v. Micron Tech. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2019)) (declining to address the state law claims separately in light of the parties’ agreement).

[26] Id. at 20 (setting the deadline for the defendants’ answers and resetting the initial case management conference for 9:00 a.m.).

[27] Id. at 2 n.2, 13 n.8 (taking the well-pleaded allegations as true and stating that “[t]he Court cannot resolve any disputes about the profitability of HBM at the pleading stage”).

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