The Eleventh Circuit Holds in Isaacs v. Google LLC That a Website Dependent on Search Rankings Lacks Antitrust Standing to Challenge Google’s Alleged Search Monopoly

The Eleventh Circuit Holds in Isaacs v. Google LLC That a Website Dependent on Search Rankings Lacks Antitrust Standing to Challenge Google’s Alleged Search Monopoly

By J.R. Howell

November 15, 2026

Isaacs v. Google LLC, No. 26-10369 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2026) (per curiam)

On November 13, 2026, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion that is unpublished as of the date of this article, affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and under California’s Unfair Competition Law that the operator of a specialized search website brought against Google on the allegation that Google diminished the website’s visibility in retaliation for its founder’s litigation against Apple.[1] The opinion is significant to businesses that depend on a dominant platform for their audience, because the court held that the plaintiffs had not shown themselves to be competitors or customers in the market that Google is alleged to monopolize and because the court declined to treat a search engine as a two-sided transaction platform under Ohio v. American Express Co., which was the theory by which the plaintiffs sought to place themselves inside that market.[2]

The plaintiffs alleged that Google removed a specialized search website from view in retaliation for its founder’s litigation against Apple.

Dr. Jeff Isaacs founded OkCaller.com, a website that employs “reverse phone search technology” to identify an anonymous caller, and serves as the chief executive officer of Greenflight Venture Corporation, which joined him as a plaintiff.[3] The plaintiffs allege that Isaacs became a lead witness in antitrust matters against Apple after Apple rejected a coronavirus tracking application that he had developed, that Google terminated what the plaintiffs describe as a partnership with them on the same day that Isaacs submitted a closing brief to the Ninth Circuit in an unrelated case involving Apple, and that OkCaller was thereafter “effectively shut down by Google.”[4] The case began in April 2024 as a pro se action for patent infringement and, after two amendments, came to rest on an operative complaint that asserted four counts under the Sherman Act and one count under the Unfair Competition Law, all of which the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed with prejudice before denying reconsideration under Rule 59(e).[5]

The court held that the plaintiffs are not efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws in the market for general search services.

The court addressed only the issues that it found dispositive among the eleven grounds for reversal that the plaintiffs asserted.[6] In the Eleventh Circuit a private plaintiff must establish antitrust standing by showing both an antitrust injury and that it is an “efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws,” and the second requirement is measured by the target area test, under which “a plaintiff must show that it is a customer or competitor in the relevant antitrust market.”[7] The operative complaint alleged that Google maintains a monopoly in the market for “general search engine services” and rested standing on the allegations that OkCaller competes with Google and that the plaintiffs are consumers of Google’s platform through their provision of content.[8] The court found three deficiencies in those allegations, the first being that the complaint describes OkCaller as a “specialized search” website and nowhere alleges that it operates in the market for general search services, the second being that the complaint alleges foreclosure in conclusory fashion without explaining how Google prevents OkCaller from competing in that market, and the third being that the complaint does not identify a competitor that was willing and able to enter the market but for Google’s exclusionary conduct, which the circuit requires of a plaintiff whether it sues as a customer or as a competitor.[9] The court separately held that Isaacs could not assert the antitrust counts in his own right, because an officer of a corporation lacks standing to sue for an antitrust violation that injures the corporation and its business.[10]

The court declined to extend the two-sided platform analysis of American Express to a search engine on which no transaction occurs.

The plaintiffs sought to overcome these deficiencies by arguing that Google is a multi-sided platform of the kind recognized in American Express, in that Google intermediates a “digital handshake” between the user and the publisher each time a user clicks on a search result, which the plaintiffs characterized as “plausibly like a transaction.”[11] The court disagreed, reasoning that the plaintiffs acknowledged that neither side pays a cash price at the moment of a search, that the product supplied by the credit card networks in American Express was the transaction itself, and that no decision of the Supreme Court or of the Eleventh Circuit has extended the multi-sided platform theory to a platform that is not transactional.[12] The court added that, even if Google could be considered a multi-sided transactional platform, the complaint does not identify OkCaller as a two-sided platform, which American Express requires of a competitor to a two-sided transaction platform.[13] The court also relied on the statement in American Express that a market should be treated as one-sided when the effects of indirect network effects and relative pricing are minor, observing that neither the complaint nor the plaintiffs’ briefs referred to the indirect network effects or the relative pricing of the platform that they alleged.[14] The court found persuasive the Supreme Court’s explanation of why a newspaper that sells advertisements operates in a one-sided market, and applied that reasoning to search, “albeit imperfectly,” on the ground that a website’s ranking may affect its visibility and value while users who search for free may care little about the ranking of a particular website so long as the results satisfy their needs.[15]

The claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law failed under each of its three prongs.

The court held that the plaintiffs could not proceed under the unlawful prong, which borrows violations of other laws, because they lack standing to assert a violation of the antitrust laws and because their allegation that Google violated the federal witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512, neither identified the provision at issue nor explained how Google violated it.[16] On the unfair prong, the court answered the plaintiffs’ argument that Cel-Tech gives that prong a scope broader than the Sherman Act by assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs had characterized Cel-Tech correctly and by holding that Cel-Tech is “expressly limited” to injuries that result from the unfair act of a direct competitor, whereas the complaint acknowledges that Greenflight has no product that competes directly with Google and alleges that Google leveraged its dominance in search to distort competition in downstream markets.[17] The court held that the fraudulent prong is subject to Rule 9(b) and that the single paragraph in which the complaint alleges that Google misled consumers, publishers, and developers about the operation of its search engine “falls woefully short” of that standard, in that it does not say how Google deceived them, who at Google did so, or when.[18] The court then held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration, which Isaacs had sought on the basis of a decision by a federal district court in California denying a motion to dismiss by Google in a separate case.[19]

The opinion narrows the routes by which a business that depends on a dominant platform may sue the platform.

For website publishers, application developers, and specialized search providers, the opinion means that a complaint in the Eleventh Circuit against a platform on whose rankings they depend must allege either that the plaintiff competes or buys in the monopolized market and that a willing and able entrant was excluded from it, or facts concerning indirect network effects and relative pricing that would permit a court to treat the two sides of the platform as a single market.[20]The opinion applies to a search engine the newspaper characterization that I have described elsewhere as one of the two routes by which American Express removes the non-paying participants on a platform from the market in which harm is measured.[21] For platforms, the opinion supplies a court of appeals’ reasoning, drawn from the Supreme Court’s own treatment of newspapers, for confining the two-sided analysis to platforms that sell a jointly consumed transaction.[22]With respect to the Unfair Competition Law, the court’s treatment of the unfair prong rests on the footnote in Cel-Tech in which the California Supreme Court stated that its discussion and its test “are limited to that context” of an action by a competitor alleging anticompetitive practices, which means that the opinion does not decide which test governs a claim of unfairness by a plaintiff that is not a direct competitor of the defendant.[23]


[1] Isaacs v. Google LLC, No. 26-10369, slip op. at 1–2, 4, 16 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2026) (per curiam) (affirming the dismissal of the second amended complaint and the denial of the motion to alter or amend the judgment).

[2] Id. at 7–11 (holding that the plaintiffs “fail to establish antitrust standing” and that their analogy to Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018), “is unavailing”).

[3] Id. at 2 (describing the allegations of the original complaint concerning OkCaller and Greenflight).

[4] Id. at 2–3 (reciting the allegation that the termination occurred around Thanksgiving 2022 and that Isaacs suspected retaliation for his litigation against Apple).

[5] Id. at 2–5 (recounting the procedural history from the original complaint through the denial of the motions under Rule 59(e)).

[6] Id. at 5 (explaining that the court “need not consider all the issues raised so long as there exists any ground in the record to support affirmance”).

[7] Id. at 6 (quoting Fla. Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 105 F.3d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1997)) (setting out the two requirements of antitrust standing and the target area test).

[8] Id. at 6–7 (describing the allegations on which the plaintiffs predicated antitrust standing).

[9] Id. at 7–8 (citing Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 711 F.3d 1264, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013)) (finding that the plaintiffs “have not plausibly demonstrated” that they are efficient enforcers).

[10] Id. at 11 (quoting Nat’l Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602, 608 (11th Cir. 1984)) (reasoning that the counts asserted by Isaacs stem from the same allegations as the counts asserted by Greenflight).

[11] Id. at 8–9 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ argument that the “digital handshake” is “plausibly like a transaction”).

[12] Id. at 9 (citing American Express, 585 U.S. at 545 n.8) (concluding that the district court did not err in “not applying a non-transaction multi-sided framework”).

[13] Id. at 9–10 (citing American Express, 585 U.S. at 546) (rejecting the argument that the district court failed to analyze the pleaded platform on any terms).

[14] Id. at 10 (quoting American Express, 585 U.S. at 544) (noting the absence of any reference to “the indirect network effects or relative pricing of Google’s alleged multi-sided platform”).

[15] Id. at 10–11 (quoting American Express, 585 U.S. at 544–45) (stating that the plaintiffs “have not persuaded us that general search services like Google ‘exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected pricing and demand’”).

[16] Id. at 12–13 (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Ct., 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992)) (holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the unlawful theory of liability).

[17] Id. at 13–14 (citing Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 186–87 & n.12 (1999)) (holding that the plaintiffs’ reliance on Cel-Tech “is therefore unavailing”).

[18] Id. at 14–15 (citing Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 568 (11th Cir. 1994)) (finding that the allegations “lack specific details about how Google allegedly misled or deceived consumers, publishers, and developers”).

[19] Id. at 16 (reasoning that the district court correctly dismissed the operative complaint).

[20] Id. at 6–8, 10 (requiring a customer or competitor in the relevant market and a willing and able entrant, and treating a market as one-sided where indirect network effects and relative pricing are minor).

[21] J.R. Howell, Two-Sided Market Structure Creates an Antitrust Blind Spot for Non-Paying Users, The American Counsel, pt. III (explaining that a platform characterized as a newspaper leaves the non-paying side with no market in which to be harmed). Isaacs, slip op. at 10–11 (applying the newspaper reasoning of American Express to general search services).

[22] Isaacs, slip op. at 9–11 (distinguishing the transaction that credit card networks supply from a search for which neither side pays a cash price).

[23] Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 187 n.12 (stating that “[n]othing we say relates to actions by consumers or by competitors alleging other kinds of violations of the unfair competition law”). Isaacs, slip op. at 13–14 (assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs’ characterization of Cel-Tech is correct).

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