In Ringgold v. EssilorLuxottica S.A., the Second Circuit Explains Why the Purchasers Failed to Plead a Market for Premium Eyewear

A discount retailer sold Ray-Bans beside frames the purchasers excluded from their proposed market. The Second Circuit explains why those allegations fell short and leaves open whether designer frames compete in a market of their own.

In Ringgold v. EssilorLuxottica S.A., the Second Circuit Explains Why the Purchasers Failed to Plead a Market for Premium Eyewear

Antoine Acosta alleged that he bought Ray-Ban frames and Crizal prescription lenses from an independent seller. Had the seller raised the price of the Ray-Bans, it might have kept Acosta’s business by offering him a different pair of frames. Offering him a different lens would still have left him looking for a frame. In Ringgold v. EssilorLuxottica S.A., the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an antitrust suit brought by Acosta and two other indirect purchasers because their proposed market for premium eyewear grouped products they conceded were not substitutes. Dividing those products into three narrower markets did not save the complaint. The purchasers still had to explain why buyers would accept the alternatives they included and pass over the ones they left out.[1]

The October 30, 2026, summary order has no precedential effect. Its particular interest for private antitrust litigation lies in what the panel said about frames. The judges considered it entirely possible that premium frames compete in a market of their own. What they could not reconcile was a complaint that put identically priced frames on opposite sides of the market boundary and described a discount retailer as operating in a wholly separate segment even as it sold the very Ray-Bans on which the purchasers based their claims.[2]

Counting the brands EssilorLuxottica controlled did not establish its share of the market

Pamela Ringgold and Acosta alleged that they bought Ray-Ban spectacle frames from unaffiliated sellers. Anthony Persuitti alleged that he bought Ray-Ban sunglasses. According to their amended complaint, the EssilorLuxottica companies had acquired eyewear brands, secured exclusive licenses from fashion houses, and acquired optical retailers. A seller carrying the companies’ brands allegedly risked losing access to them if it violated minimum advertised price policies. The purchasers also alleged that EssilorLuxottica sold competing brands through its own stores on terms that allowed it to set retail price floors. They sought an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act for alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and pursued relief under state antitrust and consumer protection laws.[3]

In support of their claim of power, the indirect purchasers alleged that EssilorLuxottica controlled approximately 80 percent of the brands in the premium eyewear market. The denominator deserves as much attention as the percentage. If a competing frame that customers routinely buy in place of a Ray-Ban is left off the list, the calculation excludes one of the very firms that could keep the price of Ray-Bans down. Even a complete count of brands would give a label that sells a few hundred frames the same weight as one that sells hundreds of thousands. The 80 percent allegation counted the brands the purchasers said EssilorLuxottica controlled. Its significance as a measure of power depended on whom those brands competed against and how much business each accounted for.[4]

Before Essilor and Luxottica combined, the Federal Trade Commission investigated whether the merged firm could profit by raising the cost of inputs to independent eye-care professionals. An independent optician who lost a sale to a store owned by the merged firm might, in effect, lose that sale to its own supplier. In 2018, the Commission closed its merger investigation after finding insufficient evidence that enough business would return to the merged firm to make that strategy profitable. The purchasers in Ringgold challenged conduct under the Sherman Act years later. The court’s ruling on their complaint resolved neither the legality of the challenged agreements nor whether the defendants could charge supracompetitive prices.[5]

The proposed markets for lenses and sunglasses failed for different reasons

Under Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, a court can recognize a distinct market within a broader trade when the proposed boundary corresponds to how buyers and sellers do business. Distinctive uses, differences in price, and the availability of specialized vendors can all bear on that inquiry. In reviewing the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Second Circuit accepted the purchasers’ factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in their favor. Only the product market was disputed. 
Once the purchasers conceded that frames, lenses, and sunglasses were not direct substitutes, the panel examined whether any one of the three categories could support the claims in its own right.[6]

For prescription lenses, the purchasers offered a sound reason to exclude the wrong product. Someone who needs a prescription to see is unlikely to replace a corrective lens with one that provides no correction. Yet the competing product their proposed market excluded was a less expensive lens that also filled the prescription. The complaint described premium lenses by the job that every prescription lens performs. Nor did the purchasers explain why someone who wanted a designer frame as an expression of personal style would pay a premium for the lens fitted into it. At oral argument, counsel proposed treating all prescription lenses as the market. Having repeatedly limited their complaint to a premium segment, the purchasers could not enlarge it for the first time at argument.[7]

For sunglasses, the defect ran in the other direction. The purchasers included both prescription sunglasses and plano sunglasses, which have no corrective power, then described the entire category as having no vision-correction function. A pair of plano sunglasses might protect a driver’s eyes from the sun just as well as a prescription pair. That fact says little about whether a driver who needs corrective lenses can safely make the trip wearing the plano pair instead. The purchasers supplied no facts explaining why buyers would treat the two as substitutes for the use that distinguished them.[8]

The Second Circuit’s precedential decision in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG shows how a plaintiff can plead the distinction that was missing here. Physicians could administer the same medication from a vial or from a prefilled syringe. Nevertheless, the complaint described steps the syringe eliminated, risks associated with preparing an injection from a vial, and physicians’ preference for the prefilled product. The court held those allegations sufficient to plead a separate market. A purchaser making a comparable claim about lenses would have to identify the difference that affects the purchase. Consider a patient who pays more for a progressive lens because it provides a wider field of clear vision. 
An optician who knows which less expensive lens the patient tried, why it proved unsuitable, and which other lens the patient would accept can explain something about competition that the name on the package cannot.[9]

National Vision sold Ray-Bans alongside frames the purchasers placed in a separate market

Of the three proposed submarkets, premium spectacle frames presented the strongest case. A person can wear either of two frames that hold the same prescription while attaching considerable value to the design, fit, or name on one of them. The problem was that the purchasers counted EssilorLuxottica frames as premium while excluding competitors’ frames at identical prices. Price therefore could not explain their selection. They also alleged that shoppers at National Vision, a chain they placed in the value segment, could upgrade to a designer frame such as Ray-Ban. On their own account, a customer could choose between the two tiers without leaving the store.[10]

There is a limit to what that example establishes. A shopper deciding that a Ray-Ban is worth the extra money has made a comparison. Whether enough shoppers who came in for a Ray-Ban would leave with a value frame if the Ray-Ban became more expensive is a different question. Consider a retailer that cuts the price of its house frames. If it sells more house frames while Ray-Ban sales hold steady, the promotion tells a different story from one in which the house brand gains largely at Ray-Ban’s expense. The complaint alleged an opportunity to upgrade. It gave the panel little basis to infer that value frames would place so little constraint on the price of premium frames that they could be excluded from the market.[11]

Judge Jennifer Rochon confronted a similar argument on a developed record in FTC v. Tapestry, Inc.. Evidence that the same woman might own handbags from several price tiers did not foreclose a market for accessible-luxury handbags. A customer might buy one expensive bag for a special occasion and return to a different set of brands for the bags she replaced more often. The court could test that explanation against the companies’ own competitive assessments, their pricing practices, and the evidence of substitution. Tapestry involved a preliminary injunction against a merger. A purchaser seeking discovery in a Sherman Act case need not reproduce that evidentiary hearing in a complaint. 
What the comparison illustrates is why a seller’s records of whose prices it follows, or a retailer’s account of which rival takes its sales, could explain a distinction that an adjective alone cannot.[12]

The purchasers’ concession led to dismissal of their state claims with prejudice

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil had dismissed the federal claims without prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. The indirect purchasers elected to stand on their amended complaint. On appeal, they correctly observed that they had invoked an independent basis for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court should have considered that basis before treating the state claims as ones it could decline to hear upon dismissing the federal counts.[13]

Ordinarily, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction leaves the merits open. Here, however, the purchasers did not dispute that their state claims failed if their federal theories failed. The panel therefore treated the jurisdictional error as harmless, affirmed the federal dismissal, and modified the disposition of the state claims to a dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The result turned on what these appellants conceded about the state laws on which they relied. Their separate objection to filing a consolidated complaint with the direct purchasers was moot. By the time the indirect purchasers declined to amend, the direct purchasers had already announced that they were dismissing their claims with prejudice.[14]

For a purchaser investigating the next eyewear case, the most useful question to put to the retailer who sold Acosta his frames might be a fairly ordinary one. When customers who came in for Ray-Bans learned what the frames would cost, which frames did they buy instead? If those customers stayed within a recognizable group of designer brands even when a less expensive frame would hold the same lenses, the retailer could begin to explain why premium frames belong in a separate market. If customers regularly left with the house brand, a plaintiff calculating the defendants’ market share would have to account for those sales. Footnote six of Ringgold leaves the first possibility open. The purchasers’ own allegations put the value frames and the Ray-Bans at the same counter without explaining why they belonged in different markets.[15]


[1]     Ringgold v. EssilorLuxottica S.A., No. 25-2703-cv, slip op. at 3–8 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2026) (summary order) (affirming dismissal of the indirect purchasers’ federal claims). In re Eyewear Antitrust Litig., No. 24-cv-4826, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025) (describing Acosta’s purchases).

[2]     Ringgold, slip op. at 1, 8–10 & n.6 (identifying the order’s nonprecedential status and reserving the possibility of a premium-frame market).

[3]     In re Eyewear, slip op. at 5–6, 11–14, 19 (describing the indirect purchasers’ transactions, the alleged restraints, and the statutory basis for injunctive relief). Ringgold, slip op. at 3 & n.2 (identifying the claims and the parties to the appeal).

[4]     In re Eyewear, slip op. at 11–12 (distinguishing the indirect purchasers’ percentage of brands from the direct purchasers’ alleged percentage of retail revenue).

[5]     Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement Concerning the Proposed Acquisition of Luxottica Group S.p.A. by Essilor International (Compagnie Generale d’Optique) S.A. 1–2 (Mar. 1, 2018) (evaluating input alternatives and the merged firm’s ability to recapture lost sales). Ringgold, slip op. at 4–6, 10 (disposing of the federal claims on market-definition grounds).

[6]     Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325–26 (1962) (identifying practical evidence of a distinct submarket). Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Ent. Props. Tr., 817 F.3d 46, 52–55 (2d Cir. 2016) (requiring a plausible basis for excluding competing alternatives). Ringgold, slip op. at 4–7 & n.3 (applying the plausibility standard to the proposed retail product markets).

[7]     Ringgold, slip op. at 7–8 & nn.4–5 (distinguishing premium from other corrective lenses and declining to entertain a new market at argument).

[8]     Ringgold, slip op. at 8 (identifying the pleading’s inconsistent descriptions of the purpose of premium sunglasses).

[9]     Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG, 96 F.4th 327, 338–41 (2d Cir. 2024) (crediting allegations explaining why physicians preferred prefilled syringes over vials containing the same medicine).

[10]   Ringgold, slip op. at 8–10 & n.6 (identifying matched prices across the asserted boundary and the retailer’s upgrade offer). In re Eyewear, slip op. at 8–11, 23–24 (identifying National Vision and discussing the purchasers’ classifications).

[11]   Ringgold, slip op. at 9–10 & n.6 (finding substantial overlap as pleaded while reserving the possibility of a premium-frame market).

[12]   FTC v. Tapestry, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 386, 430–38, 448, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (examining industry and purchaser evidence and distinguishing ownership across tiers from substitution in response to price).

[13]   Ringgold, slip op. at 3–4, 10 (requiring consideration of the purchasers’ asserted independent jurisdictional ground). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (conferring jurisdiction over qualifying class actions). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction).

[14]   Ringgold, slip op. at 10–12 & n.7 (treating the consolidation objection as moot and directing a merits dismissal of the state claims with prejudice).

[15]   Ringgold, slip op. at 10 n.6 (limiting the ruling to the allegations in the amended complaint).

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